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INTRODUCTION
Thousands are being murdered each year. Drug production, addiction, and smuggling are rampant. The struggle for power among drug cartels has resulted in chaos in the Mexican states and cities along the US-Mexico border. Drug-related assassinations and kidnappings are now common-place occurrences throughout the country.
i -General Barry R McCaffrey, USA, retired.
The crisis caused by the violence on America"s southern border has become so acute that it has garnered the attention of the United States government at the highest levels. In its 2008 assessment of the joint operating environment the United States Joint Forces Command identified Mexico, along with Pakistan, as the states most susceptible to "rapid and sudden collapse". ii The government of Mexico has repeatedly and vociferously repudiated the assertion that Mexico is on the verge of state collapse. States does pose a significant threat to United States" national security.
The situation in Mexico can be divided into two problems with linked but separate solutions: First is the problem of the production, trafficking, and distribution of illicit drugs into the United States. Second is the national security threat the narco-trafficking cartels pose because of their power and willingness to use overwhelming violence within Mexico and, increasingly, the United States.
The United States has expressed a commitment to assisting Mexico in fighting narcotraffickers through the Mérida Initiative and other programs. The Mérida Initiative calls for $400 million in aid to go to Mexico in fiscal year 2009 in order to support the Mexican government with equipment, training, and expertise to combat the cartels and to establish long-term solutions to the problem of corrupt and inefficient law enforcement institutions.
However, the Mérida Initiative is an incomplete solution.
The crisis in Mexico is not without precedent. United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been assisting Colombia in its fight against narco-traffickers since the early 1980s with a recent focus on efforts to maintain stability in the region. While the production, trafficking, and distribution of illicit drugs in the United States is a significant problem both in terms of public health and security, solving the problem of the illicit drug trade is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper will posit the thesis that, although SOUTHCOM"s experience in Colombia differs from the situation in Mexico in many ways, methods such as the COIN operations against Colombian insurgents can provide insight into possible future operations by United
States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to enhance the stability of Mexico and protect national security. This paper will address the history of the drug wars in both Mexico and Colombia as well as highlight the Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia. The paper will then discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of SOUTHCOM"s experiences in Colombia as they might apply to Mexico and will highlight some of the difficulties in comparing the two situations, and will propose some possible operational concepts.
BACKGROUND

Mexico's Narco-Trafficking History
The tale of Mexico"s drug trade is a web of official corruption, intimidation, and violence, which began over a century ago. The topic of the drug trade in Mexico cannot be addressed fully without first putting the scale of corruption into perspective. It has been rampant ever since the drug trade began in Mexico but it took on a new dimension beginning in 1910 when Álvaro Obregón was elected president representing the National Revolutionary Party (PNR).
vi Though Mexico is, and was, a democracy, the PNR (which later became the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI) was able to maintain a stranglehold on power, including the presidency, until Vincente Fox was elected president in 2000. The party so controlled every aspect of government that Mexico became a functional oligarchy ruled by the social and politically elite. The PRI established a culture of corruption in which not only the ruling elite were demanding bribes, but also the public servants. Not surprisingly, the PRI leadership was directly linked to the drug cartels throughout most of its rule.
vii
It is important to understand how deeply the culture of corruption is in Mexico to understand why it is so difficult to catch and bring narcotraffickers to justice in the country.
If you are a politician or a policeman in Mexico you are generally either a target for bribery or a target for assassination. The most striking example was the 1997 arrest of General Jesús
Gutiérrez Rebollo who was, at the time, the nation"s drug czar. That means that they have the ability to control some drugs from cultivation to sale to the consumer and it means that the United States is at great risk for spillover violence.
In 1985 a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent named Enrique "Kike" Camerana was kidnapped in broad daylight from the streets of Guadalajara. His subsequent torture and murder by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo caught the attention of Americans and exposed the link between the cartels and highly placed government officials. Gallardo was the boss of the Sinaloa Cartel and was considered to be, at the time, the most powerful drug lord in
Mexico. xi The cartels in Mexico are far less stable and tend to be more violent than the cartels in Colombia were. There are strong patriarchal lines within the cartels which delineate who will maintain control of the operations when or if the boss is killed or captured. Therefore, it is exceedingly difficult to cause lasting disruption to the cartels by "cutting of the head". 40,000 troops and 5,000 federal police to combat the cartels. Calderón continues to be faced with the challenge of a system that is not equipped to handle the narcotraffickers who are caught. The judicial system remains rife with corruption and the federal government is wieldy. One study contends, "Mexico"s federal structure means that approximately 3,800 law enforcement institutions exist throughout the country." Today, the situation is more complex than ever. Government pressures and arrests have created fractures, infighting, and new alliances amongst the cartels. The status quo is literally changing on a daily basis. Figure 2 represents the most current make-up of the powerful cartels and the regions they control.
However, the arrest of the head of Los Zetas, a group of ex-military men who started out as killers for the Gulf Cartel but are now positioning for their own cartel, could change the whole equation.
The Mérida Initiative
Organized crime syndicates are modern enemies of democracy that relentlessly engage in kidnapping and assassination of political figures, and traffic not only in addictive and lethal substances, but also increasingly in human beings. To create an environment conducive to success in their criminal interests, they engage in heinous acts intended to instill fear, promote corruption, and undermine democratic governance by undercutting confidence in government. They assassinate or intimidate political figures and pollute democratic processes through bribes and graft in cities along both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. 
Colombia's Narco-Trafficking History
In the minds of most Americans no country is more associated with narco-trafficking and production than Colombia. Although trade in marijuana can be traced back to the 1930s in Colombia, the modern-day era of narco-trafficking in Colombia began in the late 1960s when drug use in the United States exploded, causing increased demand for illicit drugs of all stripes. In fact, it is estimated that by 1978 three quarters of the marijuana trade in the United
States originated in Colombia.
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The Colombian marijuana trade was centered on the Caribbean coast where it was estimated that 30,000 to 50,000 farmers cultivated the crop for export. xxi The dispersal of the growing meant that the marijuana industry lacked a significant command and control structure. While it spawned some violence, it did not create the kinds of vicious and powerful cartels the cocaine trade soon would.
In contrast, cocaine trafficking was in its infancy in Colombia in the 1960s. In the beginning, Colombia was merely a transit route for product grown and refined in neighboring countries like Peru and Bolivia. Cocaine transport was usually the purview of individuals as compared to organized groups and was neither well organized nor centrally controlled.
In 1971 President Richard Nixon declared that illicit drugs were "public enemy number one" and coined the enduring phrase "war on drugs" to encompass the government"s efforts to curb the import and use of narcotics in America. xxii The effort had the indirect effect of fomenting the growth and consolidation of the cocaine industry in Colombia. By the mid-1970s, enterprising traffickers were processing coca locally for export from Colombia.
Whereas the marijuana trade was a decentralized, populace industry, the cocaine trade rapidly developed into a centrally controlled, highly organized, and highly efficient entity.
As early as 1977, the DEA had identified the early beginnings of the Medellín syndicate as the dominant player in the industry. While several young men would emerge as key leaders within the organization, Pablo
Escobar would come to be the United States" enemy number one in the war on drugs.
Escobar"s power and influence were so great even in the early years that he was elected to the Colombian Congress in 1982 where he was able to lobby against the very same extradition laws enacted to bring him to justice. In what an Army War College analysis called the "narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus", the cartels, the paramilitaries, and the insurgents eventually realized that they were, simultaneously, doing business with each other, killing each other, and fighting for their own survival. xxx All were under pressure from the government and all required inflows of cash for survival.
The insurgents generally controlled the remote areas in which the cartels sought to establish their coca farms. Typically, the insurgents represented the largest armed group within these remote regions giving them the ability to charge the cartels a "use tax" to let them grow in the region without attacks by the insurgents. While the cartels often paid these remittances out of necessity, they would also frequently respond by funding the paramilitaries to counter-target the guerillas. 
The United States in Colombia Before Plan Colombia
Plan Colombia
When Colombians elected Andrés Pastrana to be president in 1998, it was apparent that the drug trade had shifted from the largely defunct cartels to the increasingly powerful In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic security to the Colombian people. also highlights significant differences in the structure of the problem. Colombia can generally be regarded as a production state where the focus is on the production of cocaine.
While there is some marijuana and heroin production in Colombia, it is an extremely small financial impact for the narcotraffickers in comparison to cocaine cultivation and production, which exceeded its nearest competitor by over 300 metric tons in 2008. lii The transnational shipment of narcotics through Colombia does not represent a major part of the business nor does the distribution of product.
In contrast, Mexico"s narcotics industry runs the gamut. It is the largest transnational trafficker of narcotics in the world. In fact, 90% of the cocaine in the world transits through 
